Robert Tagorda makes a very interesting point:
I'm surprised that nobody has really discussed the policy implications of the Zarqawi proposal. For instance, in desperately asking senior Al Qaeda leaders to help wage a "sectarian war" in Iraq, the writer contends that, in the words of the New York Times, "the American efforts to set up Iraqi security services have succeeded in depriving the insurgents of allies, particularly in a country where kinship networks are extensive":"The problem is you end up having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance," the document says. "When the Americans withdraw, and they have already started doing that, they get replaced by these agents who are intimately linked to the people of this region."
Does this observation vindicate the administration? When the Coalition Provisional Authority instituted an "ambitious" police-training plan to transfer authority to the Iraqi Governing Council, some analysts thought it was too hasty (I certainly had my reservations). But, if the establishment of Iraqi law enforcement has helped reduced the number of potential insurgent recruits, then perhaps it was worthwhile.
As I understand it, the enemies concern is that as the presence of Iraqi police and soldiers increases, local forces will become less willing to engage in guerilla style warfare. This reluctance is seen to come from a fear of injuring or killing relatives or clansmen. As Tagorda points out, if this is an accrurate observation, then the early turn over of duties to Iraqis would appear to be an excellent strategy.
Here's something that bothers me though: Why is it that the first time we hear this analysis of how effective our strategy is, it's coming from the enemy? I've not heard this angle from any of the analysts in the media and if the American intelligence community had thought of this angle the administration didn't let anyone know about it. The fact that, as Tagorda mentions, people most people still aren't talking about it leads me to believe that this angle has been overlloked.
This is disturbing because it makes me wonder what other sociological conditions our analysts have overlooked. I also wonder how dangerous such failures might be.
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